



This paper examines the correlation of financial and environmental performance in the petro-
leum refinery sector.  Emissions fell while profits rose over a ten-year period.  Ongoing efforts 
to legitimize companies in light of changing societal expectations have created an external en-
vironment that encourages the development of new technologies that promote cost efficiencies 
and good environmental performance simultaneously.  Russo and Fouts (1997) argued that 
industries subject to rapid technological advance are well suited to respond to these changes in 
the external environment.  The findings of this paper suggest that the petroleum refinery sector 
of the oil and gas industry may be meeting the challenge of the environmental movement. 
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Introduction 
 
Societal concern for environmental pro-
tection has triggered a host of new chal-
lenges to corporate managers in the form 
of new regulation and stakeholder ex-
pectations. Both have triggered costs 
that profoundly affect the business sec-
tor.  For example, there are capital costs 
for pollution control equipment, ongoing 
monitoring costs to ensure that emis-
sions stay within allowable limits, and 
penalties and court costs if they do not.  
Insurance is harder to obtain, and more 
expensive.  Debt servicing costs are 
higher for companies that do not comply 
with environmental regulation.  Stake-
holders demand better disclosure of en-
vironmental management information, 
and put downward pressure on equity 
prices for companies that do not comply. 
 
There are two competing views on the 
impact of the environmental movement 
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on business activity.  One says that pol-
lution abatement efforts divert resources 
from the production of marketable out-
put and lead to a decline in profit 
(Gollop & Roberts, 1983). The other 
says they lead to modernization of op-
erations and higher profits (Freedman & 
Stagliano, 1991).  Empirical studies 
have produced mixed results.  This pa-
per explores this question within the 
context of the Canadian oil and gas in-
dustry.  It is an integrated industry that 
begins with the upstream exploration 
and recovery activities.  Some oil is re-
covered in Canada by conventional 
means, however the country is known 
for its oilsands operations that entail the 
removal of vast areas of forested land so 
the layers of earth can be mined for the 
deposits of crude trapped in the soil.  
The downstream operations include the 
petroleum and petrochemical refineries, 
which emit a variety of chemicals into 
the air, earth, and water. The refineries 
are energy intensive operations, respon-
sible for a substantial portion of the 
greenhouse gases in this country.  The 
largest firms in this industry participate 
in both upstream and downstream opera-
tions, as well as the production, trans-
portation and distribution of end product 
to the wholesale and retail markets.  
Large, high profile firms such as these 
are subject to considerable public scru-
tiny and may be targeted specifically by 
calls for regulation (Watts & Zimmer-
man, 1990).  The demand for controls on 
environmental impacts has been growing 
for several years.  Walden & Schwartz 
(1997) said that 1989, the year of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, sparked the pub-
lic demand for corporate accountability 
for environmental impacts.  
 
This paper focuses on the petroleum re-
finery operations, which is considered to 
be part of the manufacturing sector.  
This sector accounts for 18% of Can-
ada's gross domestic product, and em-
ploys 2.3 million people at salaries that 
are 22% above the Canadian average 
(Myers, 2005).  The refineries are par-
ticularly targeted for regulation.  For 
example, despite the fact that existing 
refineries are operating at full capacity, 
and that recovery operations in the Al-
berta oilsands are expected to triple in 
by 2015 (Ollenbeger, 2005), no new re-
fineries have been built on the North 
American continent in the past 25 years.  
The Ministry of Natural Resources said 
that regulation is the primary disincen-
tive to build in Canada (Brethour, 2005).  
The costs of regulation can be difficult 
to assess (World Resources Institute, 
1995).  They are known, however, to be 
substantial. For example, in 1993 the 
costs for refineries to satisfy environ-
mental regulations in the US were esti-
mated to be $152 billion (National Pe-
troleum Council, 1993).  In Canada, the 
cost of sulphur reduction regulation 
alone is estimated to be $5.3 billion 
(Purvin & Gertz, 2004).   
 
This research uses National Pollutant 
Release Inventory information (NPRI) 
as a proxy for environmental manage-
ment, and examines the correlation of 
NPRI releases with profitability over a 
ten-year period beginning in 1993.  A 
regression of profitability on emissions, 
company size, and other independent 
variables shows an inverse relationship 
between refinery profits and NPRI re-
leases.   
 
The results of this study suggest that 
compliance with societal expectations 
can be accompanied by improvements in 
efficiency, as was suggested by Freed-
man & Stagliano (1991).  The key to 
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these findings may lie in technological 
advances that have been inspired by 
changing societal expectations, and by 
companies' efforts to legitimize them-
selves in light of these changing de-
mands.  Russo & Fouts (1997) argued 
that in industries subject to rapid techno-
logical development, good environ-
mental management and profitability can 
be pursued simultaneously. Further ex-
amination of the relationship of environ-
mental and financial performance in 
other sectors of the oil and gas industry, 
or other countries, would be a natural 





Prior research investigating the eco-
nomic impact of regulation in general, 
and environmental regulation in particu-
lar, has tended to focus on three ques-
tions: 
 
1. How do shareholders react to the 
threat of new regulation? 
2. How do they react to the imple-
mentation of new regulation? 
3. How does regulation affect profit-
ability or productivity? 
 
This current work focuses on the third 
question.  However, the literature that 
examines the earlier questions must also 
be reviewed since the results of this cur-
rent work may affect the interpretation 
of these earlier studies. 
 
 
How do shareholders react to the 
threat of new regulation? 
 
Prior literature examining this question 
has employed empirical tools of modern 
finance theory, particularly those per-
taining to stock valuation models. Capi-
tal market theory says the price of a 
share today is derived from the dis-
counted stream of expected cash flows 
(Fama, 1965).  These cash flows, in the 
form of dividends or capital gains, will 
at some time accrue to the shareholder.  
Changes in those expectations will affect 
share price.  For example, a decline in 
price may be caused by a reduction in 
the cash flows expected from future op-
erations, or by an increase in the correla-
tion of the individual stock returns with 
the returns of the overall market (This 
correlation is referred to as the stock’s 
beta).  Based on the assumptions that 
events which directly involve one com-
pany will trigger industry information 
transfers throughout the capital markets, 
thereby affecting the shares of other 
companies in the same industry (Clinch 
& Sinclair, 1987), and that anticipated 
changes in legislation (as could occur in 
the aftermath of an accident) affect in-
vestors’ expectations of future economic 
performance (Blacconiere & Patten, 
1994), numerous studies have looked for 
evidence that certain events affect share 
prices across an entire industry.   
 
One methodology often employed in a 
study of shareholder response is the 
event-study, where the event is defined 
as an information shock in the capital 
markets.  Share behavior immediately 
after the event is contrasted with the be-
havior prior to the event.  Using event-
study methodology, Blacconiere & 
Patten (1994) observed a price decline in 
the shares of chemical companies imme-
diately after the Union Carbide gas leak 
in Bhopal, India.  Share prices fell for 
electrical utility companies with nuclear 
capacity in the days following the Three 
Mile Island accident in 1979 (Hill & 
Schneeweis, 1983).  A separate study of 
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that same accident showed evidence of 
an increase in beta for competing com-
panies (Bowen et al., 1983).  A tailings 
dam failure at a Placer Dome mine in 
1996 was immediately followed by a 
decline in the price of gold mining com-
pany shares (Magness, 2007).  Share-
holder reactions like these may be 
caused by fears that a public outcry will 
trigger a legislative backlash with new 




How do shareholders react to the im-
plementation of new regulation? 
 
When an accident occurs – such as the 
gas leak, the nuclear accident, or the 
dam failure – the nature, timing, and 
extent of the new regulation, if any, is 
unknown.  This means that when share-
holders react to the threat of legislation, 
they act with uncertainty.  When legisla-
tion finally comes, new information is 
available to the market, thereby prompt-
ing investor reaction once again.  Sev-
eral event-studies have examined share 
reaction to new legislation.  For exam-
ple, Moreschi examined the share reac-
tion of pulp and paper companies in re-
sponse to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments introduced by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency.  He observed price declines, as 
well as beta changes (Moreschi, 1988).  
Other studies observed negative price 
reactions in the chemical industry, when 
the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act was changed to expand 
the reporting requirements for firms that 
release hazardous materials into the en-
vironment (Blacconiere & Northcut, 
1997); in the electrical utilities industry, 
when it was targeted by the Clean Air 
Act Amendments (Hughes, 2000); and in 
the textile industry, in response to Occu-
pational Safety and Health regulation 
that reduced allowable cotton dust limits 
(Freedman & Stagliano, 1991). 
 
These reactions are consistent with 
shareholders’ fear that new regulation 
has a dampening effect on future cash 
flows.  Company managers appear to 
share this fear.  In some industries, com-
panies respond proactively to the threat 
of new regulation by policing them-
selves to show that additional legislation 
is unnecessary (LaBar, 1988).   
 
 
How does regulation affect profitabil-
ity or productivity? 
 
The previous discussion suggests that 
share reaction is at least partially driven 
by assumptions about the answer to this 
third question, as this one focuses di-
rectly on economic impacts.  Ironically, 
this final question has received the least 
attention: the basis for the argument that 
shareholders do not like regulation be-
cause regulation lowers future cash 
flows has not been thoroughly evaluated.  
Some companies within an industry may 
actually benefit while others suffer, de-
pending on the nature and structure of 
the market.  Differential responses may 
be attributed to incremental profits ac-
cruing to some companies when regula-
tory changes create barriers to entry 
(Pashigan, 1984; Maloney & McCor-
mick, 1982). In slow growing markets, 
established companies are in a better 
position to satisfy new regulations than 
newer (smaller) competitors (The 
Economist, 1994).  On the other hand, 
new legislation may specifically target 
the larger firms. This could be because 
the larger firms have the financial re-
sources needed to implement new con-
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trol standards without undue restriction 
in operations (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990).  Furthermore, larger firms are 
subject to greater public scrutiny and 
may be targeted specifically by calls for 
regulation (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  
These issues make the overall financial 
impact of environmental regulation un-
clear.   
 
There are two competing views on how 
business is affected by environmental 
regulation.  One says that environmental 
legislation diverts resources from the 
production of marketable output, and 
leads to a decline in profitability 
(Bragdon & Marlin, 1972).  The other 
says it leads to modernization of opera-
tions, thus increasing plant efficiency 
and profit (Freedman & Stagliano, 
1991).  Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) 
proposed a theoretical model linking 
strong environmental performance with 
good financial performance.  Efforts to 
identify a consistent positive correlation 
of environmental performance with fi-
nancial performance, however, produced 
conflicting results. For example, pollu-
tion abatement reduced productivity in 
both the brewing industry (Smith & 
Sims, 1985) and the electrical utilities 
industry (Gollop & Roberts, 1983). 
Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) identified 
a positive correlation in a sample of 
companies including manufacturing 
firms, electrical utilities, and oil and gas 
extraction firms using share returns as a 
proxy for investors’ expectations of fu-
ture financial performance.  However, 
Freedman & Jaggi (1992), using a vari-
ety of financial performance indicators 
such as return on equity, return on as-
sets, cash flow to equity and cash flow 
to assets, and found no evidence to sup-
port claims that it hurt profitability in the 
pulp and paper industry.  On the other 
hand, Spicer (1978) found that better 
pollution control was associated with 
return on investment for these compa-
nies.   
 
Legitimacy theory and stakeholder the-
ory together provide a conceptual foun-
dation for a relationship between envi-
ronmental management and financial 
performance. Legitimacy theory es-
pouses a social contract between the cor-
poration and society.  A company’s sur-
vival and growth depend on its ability to 
deliver desirable ends: to distribute eco-
nomic, social or political benefits to the 
groups from which it derives its power 
(Shocker & Sethi, 1974). A company’s 
right to exist can be revoked if it 
breaches any of the terms of its social 
contract (Deegan, 2002).  This revoca-
tion may be accomplished by consumers 
reducing demand for the company's 
product or service, by suppliers limiting 
access to labor or financial capital, or by 
stakeholders lobbying for legislation that 
would impact company cash flows 
(Terreberry, 1968).  Stakeholder theory 
maintains that shareholders benefit when 
management meets the demands of mul-
tiple groups (Ruf et al., 2001).  How-
ever, while the social contract contains 
explicit terms, spelled out in the form of 
legal requirements, it also has implicit 
terms, which include non-legislated so-
cietal expectations (Gray et al., 1996).  
Because these terms are by their nature 
implied, managers vary in their interpre-
tation of these social requirements, and 
in their response.  Furthermore, these 
terms are subject to change. 
 
Earlier empirical studies that examine 
the legislative repercussions of the envi-
ronmental movement and its impact on 
profitability have employed a variety of 
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proxies for the key independent vari-
ables, such as, 
 
• the number of environmental 
charges a company has faced;  
• the number convictions a company 
has faced; 
• the size of monetary penalties; and  
• the direct cost of complying with 
regulation.   
 
Each has its limitations.  For example, 
the number of charges is driven as much 
by enforcement efforts as by company 
actions, and thus may not truly measure 
the way managers are addressing envi-
ronmental concerns (Illinitch et al., 
1998).  Fines and convictions are driven 
by regulatory efforts too, as well as by 
companies’ efforts to defend themselves 
in court (LaPlante & Lanoie, 1994). For 
this reason neither infractions nor fines 
and convictions reflect the pervasive 
impact on operations of the environ-
mental movement.  Compliance costs 
would be a better proxy, but this cost 
information is not easily obtained.  Fi-
nancial statements rarely show this in-
formation clearly.  While it may be pos-
sible to obtain this information directly 
from some of the companies, managers 
do not always have accurate data.  For 
example, managers at an Amoco refin-
ery in Virginia initially believed the cost 
of complying with environmental regu-
lation was about three percent of non-
crude operating costs.  A two-year study 
reassessed the figure at twenty-two per-
cent (World Resources Institute, 1995). 
 
Russo & Fouts (1997) argued that some 
of the earlier studies of the relationship 
between environmental and economic 
performance can be challenged on meth-
odological grounds, for failing to control 
for industry-specific factors that contrib-
ute to profitability.  They suggested that 
a company can obtain a competitive ad-
vantage by nurturing internal competen-
cies (a combination of tangible items 
such as plant and equipment, and intan-
gibles such as human resources, technol-
ogy, culture, and management skill) into 
a proprietary resource.  However, the 
value of such a resource is driven at least 
partly by the interaction of the company 
with its external environment (Collis & 
Montgomery, 1995).  This means that 
the correlation between environmental 
and economic performance may be 
driven to some extent by societal de-
mand, which changes over time.  Wal-
den & Schwartz (1997) said that 1989, 
the year of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
marked a turning point in the public de-
mand for corporate accountability for 
environmental impacts.  If they are cor-
rect, the external environment appropri-
ate for the development of a competitive 
advantage based on effective environ-
mental management may have devel-
oped in the 1990s.  For this reason, the 
relationship between environmental and 
economic performance should be revis-
ited.  
 
In summary, prior research has exam-
ined the economic impact of environ-
mental regulation by focusing on inves-
tor response to the threat – and the im-
plementation – of legislation.  In both 
cases, negative share reaction is inter-
preted to reflect investors’ assumption 
that regulation is bad for business.  Evi-
dence as to the accuracy of this assump-
tion has thus far been inconclusive. 
Changes in societal expectation of com-
pany performance, however, along with 
the changes in technology that these ex-
pectations may have engendered, mean 
that effective management of environ-
mental resources may now be an impor-
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This research explores the hypothesis 
that environmental management can be 
good for business within the context of 
the Canadian oil and gas industry – spe-
cifically, in oil refinery operations.  Oil 
and gas companies have a high public 
profile among environmental groups, 
and are therefore specifically targeted 
for regulation.  Furthermore, as part of 
the natural resource industry, petroleum 
refineries play a significant role in the 
Canadian economy.  The findings of this 
study are therefore relevant to parties 
both inside and outside the industry. 
 
A rough configuration of the statistical 
model to examine the foregoing hy-
pothesis is as follows: 
 
Profitt-  -= B-----0 + B----
1EnvirPerformance  + B2Control#1 + 
B3Control#2+ … 
 
Prior work has often measured environ-
mental performance in terms of legal 
actions against a company, or the related 
court costs.  Problems associated with 
these choices of proxy have already been 
discussed.  Furthermore, shareholders 
have been known to react when compa-
nies respond to environmental concerns, 
even when regulatory action is not in-
volved.  For example, shares of 
McDonalds rose when the company an-
nounced it would reduce waste 
(McMillan, 1996).  Pulp and paper com-
panies with better pollution control re-
cords have higher price–earnings ratios, 
and lower share price volatility than 
companies with poor records (Spicer, 
1978).  Whether these capital market 
responses mean investors are expressing 
concern that current (legal) behavior 
may in the future be challenged by ex-
panding regulation, or are merely ex-
pressing their personal values is a matter 
of speculation.  Nevertheless, these re-
sults argue in favor of a measure for en-
vironmental performance that goes be-
yond regulation or the cost of compli-
ance to include voluntary efforts as well. 
 
Two US studies have examined reac-
tions to the first public release of Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) data.  This is a 
US database disclosing the volume of 
emissions of numerous substances from 
manufacturing facilities operating under 
SIC codes 20-39, with 10 or more em-
ployees.  These companies are required 
to report their annual on-site releases 
and off-site transfers of each of over 300 
specific chemicals. Hamilton (1993) 
noted an abnormal negative share price 
response in companies that reported un-
expectedly high emissions in 1989, the 
first year the data were released.  Konar 
& Cohen (1997) found that those com-
panies whose shares suffered the most 
responded by reducing emissions more 
than their peers.  The authors used these 
findings to argue that public information 
is “quasi-regulatory.”  In other words, by 
releasing information that might be used 
to organize boycotts, lobby for addi-
tional regulation, or bid share price 
down, the government has effectively 
raised the cost of pollution, thereby giv-
ing companies an economic incentive to 
reduce emissions. 
 
More recent studies have used TRI data 
to investigate the relationship between 
financial and environmental perform-
ance (King & Lenox, 2001a; 2001b; 
2002).  For example they found that fi-
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nancial performance, as measured by 
Return on Assets and Tobin’s q, is 
driven by waste prevention (King & 
Lenox, 2002).  The Canadian equivalent 
of the TRI is the National Pollutant Re-
lease Inventory (NPRI).  Like TRI emis-
sions, NPRI emissions are not illegal.  
Environment Canada collects the data 
not to punish companies, but as a means 
of assessing trends over time.  Further-
more, emissions reduction is not a legis-
lative requirement.  In this sense, it can 
be argued that the NPRI reporting re-
quirements embody the objectives of the 
environmental movement, and reflect 
the extent to which companies address 
some of the implied terms of the social 
contract.  NPRI data are reported annu-
ally, quantified, and available electroni-
cally, all of which simplifies the data 
collection process.  For these reasons, 
the volume of NPRI emissions is used as 
the key dependent variable in this study. 
 
The data collected span the years 1993 
(the first year that NPRI data were avail-
able) to 2002.  A statistically significant 
and negative emissions factor would 
support anecdotal reports that invest-
ments in effective environmental man-
agement earn superior long-term returns 
(Israelson, 1998).  On the other hand, a 
significant and positive coefficient 
would support investors’ assumption 






The petroleum refinery process trans-
forms crude oil, which is virtually use-
less in its natural state, into a wide vari-
ety of products such as propane, auto-
motive and aviation fuel, furnace oil, 
lubricants, and asphalts. It is important 
to identify control variables that capture 
the specifics of the operation.  For exam-
ple, each refinery is configured to pro-
duce a complement of products that 
maximizes profit margins.  This involves 
taking the proximity of nearest markets 
into consideration, and it implies that 
two refineries will not necessarily be 
designed to produce the same outputs.  
This means that volume of output cannot 
be used as an activity control variable.  
However, the main feedstock for each of 
these refineries is the crude itself.   In 
this analysis, the total volume of crude 
processed will be used as a size control 
variable.  Refinery-specific data were 
unavailable, so the data were collected 
on a per-company basis. A positive cor-
relation with profit is anticipated. 
 
Productive capacity is tied to investment 
in refinery assets.  The refinery opera-
tion is capital intensive, with the cost of 
energy being the second highest operat-
ing cost.  Capital employed will be used 
as a second control variable, to capture 
the impact of company size.  The direc-
tion of correlation of this variable with 
profit is expected to be positive. 
 
Time is included- in this paper as a trend 
variable, to capture the impact of uni-
dentified factors that may be correlated 
with the dependent variable (Gujarati, 
1995)  These factors could include 
changes in technology, energy effi-
ciency, or the cost of labor.  The direc-
tion of association is indeterminate be-
cause the time variable Yeart  captures 
the aggregate impact of numerous fac-
tors. 
 
The model for this analysis is as follows: 
NetInc-i,,t-  -= B-----0 + B----1NPRIi,t 
+ B2Crudei,t + B3CapEmpi,t + + B4Yrt 
 [1] 
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Company Name No. Refineries 
Total production capacity 
(barrels of crude input per day) 
Husky 2 35,250 
Imperial Oil 4 502,200 
Parkland 1 6,000 
Petro-Canada 4 313,200 
Shell 3 299,200 
Sunoco 1 78,000 
Subtotal 15 1,233,850 
Table 1 
Companies Included in the Regression Analysis 
Companies Excluded (Each with one refinery) 
Company Name 
Total production capacity 
(barrels of crude input  
per day) 
Valero (a US company; formerly Utramar, in Quebec) 215,000 
Irving Oil (private Canadian company in  
New Brunswick) 
250,000 
North Atlantic Refinery (private Canadian company in 
Newfoundland) 
105,000 




NetInci,t  is the net income (in  mil-
lions of Canadian dollars) 
from refinery operations of 
company i in year t; 
NPRIi,t is total NPRI emissions (in 
metric tons) from company i 
refineries in year t; 
Crudei,t is the volume of crude oil 
input (in millions of barrels) 
processed by company i in 
year t;  
CapEmpi,,t is total capital employed (in 
millions of Canadian dol-
lars) in refinery operations 
for company i in year t; and, 
Yrt  is the year, ranging from 
1993 to 2002.  
 
Data description and discussion of 
variables 
 
Total petroleum refinery capacity in 
Canada (measured in volume of crude 
oil input) is about 1,855,850 barrels per 
day in 2004.  There were 19 petroleum 
refineries in Canada in 2003, owned by 
10 organizations.  This excludes refiner-
ies classified as upgraders, as well as 
petrochemical refineries.  Of the 19 pe-
troleum refineries, those operated by 
private companies were eliminated from 
this study because of difficulty in obtain-
ing financial performance data.  Refiner-
ies belonging to US companies were 
also eliminated, in order to avoid com-
plications that could arise from the dif-
ferences between US and Canadian fi-
nancial reporting guidelines.  Data were 
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collected from the remaining six compa-
nies (15 refineries) identified below: 
 
1. Husky Energy, with refineries in 
Lloydminster and British Columbia; 
2. Imperial Oil, with operations in 
Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Alberta; 
3. Parkland Industries, in Alberta; 
4. Petro-Canada, with refineries in Al-
berta, Ontario, and Quebec; 
5. Shell Canada, in Quebec, Ontario, 
and Alberta; and 
6. Sunoco, in Ontario. 
 
The refineries included in this study ac-
count for a production capacity of 
1,233,850 barrels per day (see Table 1), 
or about 66% of total capacity in Can-
ada. 
 
Refineries classified as upgraders use a 
higher density feedstock which is much 
heavier and cheaper than the crude used 
by the petroleum refineries.  For exam-
ple, in early October 2004, Cold Lake 
heavy crude cost about $29 US per bar-
rel, compared to about $54 US for the 
lighter West Texas Intermediate crude 
used by the petroleum refineries.  Up-
graders were excluded from this study 
because the influence on profit of these 
diverse input costs would complicate the 
analysis.  Petrochemical refineries were 
also excluded.  This is a separate pro-
duction process downstream from petro-
leum refinery operations. 
 
Most of the refineries are owned by 
large integrated companies whose opera-
tions include exploration and recovery, 
petroleum refining, petrochemical refin-
ing, and retail marketing.  Ten years of 
data (1993 to 2002) were collected for 
all of the integrated companies except 
Husky Oil and Parkland Industries.  
Husky did not become a publicly traded 
company until 2000.  Husky's annual 
reports contain sufficient historic infor-
mation to provide data for the years 
2000 to 2002 only.  Parkland required 
special treatment (discussed below) be-
cause of its size.  Parkland sold its refin-
ery in 2000. For this reason only eight 
years of data are available for this com-
pany.   
 
Based on the six companies included in 
this analysis, the total dataset includes 
51 company-year observations.  Addi-
tional detail about the measurement of 
the individual factors in model [1] is 
provided below. 
 
NetInci,t  For the integrated companies, 
the net income from refinery 
operations is shown in the seg-
mented disclosures either in 
the financial statement notes, 
or in the Management Discus-
sion and Analysis section of 
the annual report.  The annual 
report of Parkland Industries, 
the smallest company in the 
analysis, did not provide the 
level of detail provided by the 
other companies. While Park-
land operated one refinery up 
until 2000, its main business 
was marketing gasoline, and 
the company did not disclose 
petroleum refinery operations 
as a separate segment.  For this 
reason an estimate of NetInci,t  
for Parkland Industries was 
based on the proportion of 
sales volume for which cost of 
sales was produced internally. 
NPRIi,t Each refinery has a specific 
NPRI Site Identification num-
ber.  The annual emission vol-
umes (in metric tons) of each 
reported substance are aggre-
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Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
NPRIi,t 4600 11963 21.52 77482 
CapEmpi,t 1361 946 24 3027 
Crudei,t 76 58 1.6 164 
NPRIi,t Total National Pollutant Release Inventory emissions (metric tons) 
CapEmpi,,t Total cost of capital employed, in Canadian dollars (millions). 
Crudei,t Barrels of crude input as feedstock (millions) 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
N = 51  
NPRIi,t 1.000     
CapEmpI,t 0.3031 1.000   
Crudei,t 0.3029 0.9561 1.000 
  NPRIi,t CapEmpI,t Crudei,t 
Correlation Matrix 
gated into a single figure.  For 
companies with more than one 
refinery the NPRI emissions 
from each refinery are aggre-
gated into a single number.  
(This adjustment was neces-
sary because refinery-specific 
financial performance infor-
mation was not available.) 
Crudei,t Volume of crude processed 
was obtained from the annual 
reports.   
CapEmpi,,tThis is the investment cost of 
refinery assets less accumu-
lated amortization.  
(Technological innovation re-
quires ongoing investment in 
these assets, as discussed later 
in this paper, such that net in-
vestment increases over time.)  
The integrated companies pro-
vided this information in their 
segmented disclosures.  For 
Parkland, the information 
came directly from the balance 
sheet. 
 
Summary statistics are shown for the 
independent variables in Table 2.  Given 
that refineries are built to accommodate 
a specified crude input capacity, that 
management wants to run the refineries 
at or near full capacity each year, that 
higher volume of production means 
greater emissions, and that volume is a 
factor in model [1], correlations between 
Crudei,t, CapEmpi,,t,.  and NPRIi,t.  are 
likely to be high.  The correlation matrix 
in Table 2 confirms this expectation.  In 
order to avoid issues arising from multi-
collinearity in the data, CapEmpi,,t,. and 
NPRIi,t  are each  regressed against vol-
ume (Crudei,t), and the residuals from 
each regression are used in place of the 
original data in model [1]. 
Description of Variables 
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4.  Results 
Regression results are shown in Table 3.  
All control variables are statistically 
significant at α = 0.05 or less, with signs 
in the direction anticipated.  About 
sixty-six percent of the variation in 
NetInci,t is explained by variation in the 
independent factors identified in this 
model.  The key independent variable 
NPRIi,t is statistically significant at α = 
0.05, and negative.  These results argue 
that when aggregate NPRI emissions 
drop by one metric ton (while size of 
operation and volume of crude input are 
controlled), the income from petroleum 
refinery operations rises by about two 
thousand dollars. 
Table 3 
Results of Linear Regression Analysis 
NetInci,t  = B0 + B1NPRIi,t + B2Crudei,t  + B3CapEmpi,t +  B4Yrt 
where: 
NetInci,t  is the net income from refinery operations in Canadian dollars (millions)  
NPRIi,t  is total NPRI emissions (in metric tons), adjusted for volume 
Crudei,t     is the volume of crude oil input in barrels 
CapEmpi,,t is total capital employed in refinery operations in Canadian dollars 
(millions), adjusted for volume 
Yrt  is the year, ranging from 1993 to 2002 
    Expected sign Coefficient t-value 
B0i Intercept +/– -28,878 -3.922*** 
B1i NPRIi,t +/– -0.002 -2.451** 
B2i Crude-i,t + 0.001 8.854*** 
B3i CapEmpi,t + 0.087 2.545** 
B4i Yrt +/– 9.878 2.779*** 
Significant at:  α = 0.01*** α = 0.05**  
R----2 = 0.66 
These results conflict with the “dead loss 
expenditure” argument that says envi-
ronmental legislation channels cash to-
ward expenses that satisfy environ-
mental performance expectations, but 
does nothing to enhance the financial 
performance of the company (Gollop & 
Roberts, 1983).  An explanation for 
these findings is not immediately obvi-
ous.  After all, just as minimum wage, 
pay equity, and child labor laws increase 
the costs of doing business, environ-
mental regulation also increases the cost 
of doing business.  A reconciliation of 
the intuitively unacceptable finding that 
rising costs mean higher profit may 
come from Freedman & Stagliano, 
(1991), who suggest that the moderniza-
tion of operations to meet environmental 
control requirements leads to increases 
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in plant efficiency and profit. It should 
be noted that the correlation between 
these two performance measurements, 
profit and emissions, is driven at least 
partially by external factors such as so-
cietal expectations (Russo & Fouts, 
1997).  Possibly the ongoing effort to 
legitimize business operations has trig-
gered the demand for technological ad-
vancements that include environmental 
impact considerations in the quest for 
higher production efficiencies.  If this is 
the case, the conclusions drawn in ear-
lier studies that shareholders are op-
posed to calls for environmental man-
agement are not incorrect.  They are, 
however, interpretations made in light of 
current-day technology and current-day 
mores.  Changing social expectations 
affect not only the regulatory environ-
ment, but also the drive for technologi-
cal advancements.  It is through such 
advancements that profitability and envi-
ronmental performance – once consid-
ered irreconcilable – can now be consid-
ered simultaneously.  
 
5.  Summary, discussion and sugges-
tion for future studies 
Prior literature shows that shareholders 
factor the perceived repercussions of 
environmental legislation into share 
price.  Regulation that limits allowable 
emissions restricts volume of activity 
and/or commits a company to significant 
capital cost and operating expenditures.  
For this reason, the environmental 
movement has been accused of subject-
ing firms to costs that satisfy legislative 
requirements at the expense of financial 
performance.  On the other hand, it has 
also been argued that given the appropri-
ate internal and external environment, 
modernization of production facilities 
can lead to cost efficiencies as well as 
improvements in environmental per-
formance. 
 
Prior studies of the relationship between 
financial and economic performance 
have produced equivocal results.  Russo 
& Fouts (1997) said these findings are 
inconclusive because they are derived 
from statistical models that fail to con-
trol for factors that contribute to profit-
ability.  This study addresses that issue 
by focusing on a single industry seg-
ment, and by identifying profit related 
control factors specific to that segment.  
The findings of this study support the 
conclusion that over the ten-year period 
from 1993 to 2002, a decline in NPRI 
reportable emissions has been associated 
with growing profits.  In other words, 
there is a positive relationship between 
environmental and financial perform-
ance.   
 
Russo & Fouts (1997) also argued that 
industry growth plays a role in determin-
ing when good financial performance 
and good environmental performance 
can be pursued simultaneously.  While 
the use of new, unproven technologies 
involves pay-off uncertainties, techno-
logical innovation is accelerated for in-
dustries in a growth phase.  While no 
new petroleum refineries have been built 
in North America since 1980 (in fact, 
some have been shut down) core petro-
leum technology continues to be devel-
oped, and net refinery capacity continues 
to keep up with a growing demand 
through incremental expansion and tech-
nological upgrades in existing refineries.  
For example, the introduction of a pat-
ented process to improve the perform-
ance of the catalytic cracking units pre-
sent in most refineries has increased 
the yield of gasoline per unit feedstock 
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from 55% liquid yield to over 75% 
(Orr ,2004). 
 
Another reason that some of the earlier 
literature reported contrary results – a 
negative correlation of environmental 
with financial performance – could be 
time-related.  A long-term orientation 
toward environmental stewardship calls 
for a commitment at all company levels, 
including production planning, perform-
ance measurement, and product/process 
design, and management expertise in 
environmental stewardship can, over 
time, evolve into a proprietary resource.  
However, the value of such a resource is 
driven at least partly by external factors 
(Collis & Montgomery, 1995).  As so-
cietal demand for cleaner technologies 
has grown over time, these technologies 
have become increasingly available.  For 
example, the process of scanfining was 
introduced about five years ago.  This 
process removes virtually all sulphur 
from gasoline at about one-third the en-
ergy costs of older processes, thus help-
ing refineries to meet new regulatory 
requirements while reducing their sec-
ond highest operating cost.  It can there-
fore be argued that the environmental 
movement is a major social force that 
not only presents new challenges to 
business, but also the opportunity to sat-
isfy those challenges.  In this way, envi-
ronmental management has become a 
legitimizing, value-creating activity, at 
least in some industry segments. 
 
Many questions remain unanswered.  No 
effort has been made in this study to test 
whether or not the best environmental 
performance (lowest emissions) is asso-
ciated with the best financial perform-
ance. This paper does not attempt to find 
evidence in support of Hart's natural 
resource perspective (1995), which ar-
gues that a positive correlation between 
environmental performance and profit 
can be a distinct competitive advantage 
available only to certain companies.  
Clarkson et al., (2006) have made some 
progress here, with findings that a com-
pany's financial liquidity and R&D ex-
penditures contribute toward the deter-
mination of a competitive advantage 
across the US manufacturing sector.  An 
examination of this nature would be a 
logical extension to the current study. 
Furthermore, this study looks only at the 
petroleum refinery section of the oil and 
gas industry, and no assumption is made 
that these findings extend to other parts 
of the industry.  
 
The findings of this paper could also tie 
into a related branch of environmental 
accounting research – the examination 
of disclosure versus environmental per-
formance.  The disclosure studies have 
produced evidence that is once again, 
inconclusive. It has been argued on the 
one hand that companies use environ-
mental disclosure to explain poor finan-
cial results (Neu et al., 1998; Freedman 
& Jaggi, 1988).  On the other hand, 
Cormier & Gordon (2001) found that 
companies in good financial health made 
greater financial disclosures.  Possibly 
the correlation is industry specific.  In 
their analysis of social and environ-
mental disclosure, Gray et al. (2001) 
have also identified time and industry 
segment as important factors.  By identi-
fying those industries for which environ-
mental performance has become a profit 
creating activity, as this current paper 
begins to do, efforts to better capture 
the disclosure decision  making proc-
ess may be possible. 
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